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II. The Experimental Setting
The experimental setting involved two markets. One market is for output, called x, and the other market is for input, called y. The output market consisted of six buyers. Each buyer had the same induced value function shown on Table I . The input market contained six sellers with the induced cost function in Table II . In addition, there were four producers each of which had the production technology for producing x that is contained in Table III . The parameters in the tables are in terms of dollars. Subjects were presented the redemption values and costs in terms of an artificial medium called francs. All trading took place in francs which could be converted to dollars at rates of 1 cent, 3 cents, and 4 cents per franc for buyers, sellers, and producers, respectively. A total of four experiments were conducted. Subjects were students of a principles of economics class at the California Institute of Technology. Many of these subjects had participated in computerized multiple double-auction markets prior to these experiments. Experiment 4 involved mostly subjects with no prior experience at all. Instructions were read and a practice period was used to familiarize subjects with the trading technology.
Two markets were open simultaneously for a period of 10 minutes for the first few periods and then the time was reduced to 6 minutes. Producers were able to purchase y and add it to their y inventories. Once in inventory, y could be transformed into x, according to Table III, by Table III 
when P = the price of x. By application of a similar set of postulates, the values in Table II 
The definition of C(xi) is C(xi) = pYi (6) so using the competitive hypothesis that price is a constant one gets C'(xi) = p(dyi/dxi).
Since there is only one input, the binomial formula can be applied to ( The solution to this yields the equilibrium P expressed as a function of p. To find the equilibrium price of y, i.e., p, one must find the demand for y and then apply the law of supply and demand to find the equilibrium price.
To find market demand for y, the individual demand functions must be derived. From the profit maximization hypothesis one has max Pxi -pyi. 
From differentiation of (3) we get P(7 -yi) =p.
Solve for yi to get individual demand function for y yi=7 -(p/P).
The market demand function is the sum of individual demands from the 4 demanders under competition
In order to find the equilibrium price of y as given in (23) 
In order for both markets to be in equilibrium, the equilibrium prices P and p must satisfy both equilibrium equations (14) and (23) , 129), (23.4, 135.2), (35.1, 144), (33.1, 155.7) for experiments 1, 2, 3 sense that one would expect a very different distribution from simply random behavior of prices and volume. Furthermore, if one accepts the double exponential model as a representation of the data, prices are converging to the equilibrium.'
1. We introduce the double exponential adjustment model as a tool to explore the visual impression that prices are converging to the competitive equilibrium. While the model is ad hoc in the sense that it has no theoretical justification, it is nevertheless a tool that permits us to make objective statements about the patterns in the data.
The model for any given market is iPtc -P*, = aept+YC where t = period number c = contract (transaction) number in the period P* = competitive equilibrium price.
To the extent that this model is a representation of the data, prices are converging to the competitive equilibrium between periods if / < 0 and within periods if y < 0. The parameter a measures the distance from equilibrium at the beginning of the experiment in francs. If a = 0 then the markets opened at equilibrium and neither f or y need be different from zero.
As shown in Table V , the , 's and y's tend to be negative and significant. The exceptions are the coefficient for c in market 2 of experiments 1 and 2. In both of these markets y is positive. Notice, however, that in both of these markets Efficiency refers to the actual consumers' plus producers' surplus taken as a percentage of the maximum possible. Operationally, efficiency is the total of redemption values received by the final holders of x minus the total of costs paid by the initial suppliers of y. The difference between the two totals is a measure of consumer plus producer surplus generated by the market. The efficiency measure is the difference between the totals taken as a percentage of the maximum possible difference. The maximum possible in attained efficiency is 100 percent (which is predicted by the competitive model).
The efficiency numbers in Table IV do model are applied with an "as if" interpretation, the resulting model is very powerful. Aside from the dynamics, prices and outputs behave as if the system is "competitive" in the sense of the competitive model. The markets appear to be capable of solving not only the problem as posed by competitive theory but also even harder problems. These markets converged to near the equilibrium within an hour after instructions were read to the participants. In essence, the mathematical problem was solved quickly and without all the relevant information existing in a single place. The participants knew only their own parameters and none of the theory. Some sort of parallel processing appears to be taking place but its form remains a mystery.
